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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

EVOLUTION OF THE STOP, LOOK AND LISTEN RULE
IN PENNSYLVANIA
"Courts frequently define the standard of self-protective care to which a
plaintiff must conform to a degree of particularity to which they rarely define the
standard to which a defendant must conform." 1 In Pennsylvania there is no better
example of the above statement than the well known "stop, look and listen" rule.
The situation is this. A motorist approaches the grade crossing of a railroad.
Both the motorist and the engineer have the duty to avoid a collision. An accident
occurs. The motorist sues the railroad. If the motorist failed to conform to the
standard of a reasonably prudent motorist he is contributorily negligent and will
be precluded from recovery in the suit against the railroad even though the engineer
was negligent. Is the court or the jury to say, under the facts and circumstances,
whether the plaintiff used the care that a reasonably prudent motorist would?
In this type of case the courts of Pennsylvania have established a standard of care
to which the plaintiff must conform and have applied it vigorously for nearly a
century. The legal duty of anyone crossing a railroad track is to stop, look and listen,
and failure to perform the duty under any circumstances is negligence per se. There
is no necessity to submit the case to the jury for in the eyes of the law that is the
care a reasonably prudent man would use to avoid collision with a railroad train.
The stop, look and listen rule will be applied as a matter of law:
1. Where the plaintiff admits he did not stop, look or listen;
2. Where it is clear from his testimony that he did not do so; or
3. Where the evidence is such that, even if there is testimony that the plaintiff
performed his duty, the physical facts show that he must have seen an approaching train if he had done what the law requires.
Whether failure to stop, look and listen is negligence per se is never squarely
presented in the modern cases. The plaintiff has always stopped, looked and
listened. The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the facts are sufficiently incontrovertible so that verdict may be properly directed; or, (2) whether the plaintiff
stopped, looked and listened at the proper place, which is a question for the court
or the jury under the given circumstances. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court frequently reasserts the doctrine as dictum, saying as it recently did :2
"The unbending rule as to the duty of a traveler on a public highway,
as he approaches a railroad crossing over it, is to stop, look and listen."
1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 476, comment (a).
2 349 Pa. 123, 30 A.2d 644 (1944). The majority opinion illustrates the particularity with

which the court will define a law where the plaintiff has the duty to stop. This corollary rule is becoming as harsh as the original from which it sprang. Two judges dissented, saying this issue was
properly for the jury.
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but actually holding that it was proper for the lower court to decide as a matter
of law that the plaintiff did not stop at the proper place.
The rule originally developed many years ago, when trains were an awesome
new invention and a vastly improved means of transportation. The first case in
1858 to consider the respective duties is the quaint old case of Reeves v. The Delaware, Lackawanna and 1Vestern Railroad Co., 3 where a drover is suing for the loss
of his cattle. The plaintiff had 300 cows to drive across a railroad track. He knew
the train was momentarily expected but nevertheless proceeded to drive his herd
across. The cattle were upon the track; the train approached; they met. Who
was negligent? The drover in failing to wait until the train had passed, or the
engineer in failing to slow down. The court says of the drover:
"He was bound to use reasonable care. The unquestionableness of his
right of transit did not release him from the obligation of that degree
of diligence and prudence which men in his situation ordinarily exercise."
Of the engineer:
"It is said that the engineer did not see the cattle upon the track, and
could not look, because he had to keep his eye on the track. But that
was because he was going too fast. Dashing forward with such J'ehu
speed as to be unable to see a drove of cattle half a mile long, was a very
rash mode of approaching the crossing of a great public thoroughfare,
which must be approached on a curve, and after issuing from a cut that
would more or less obstruct his view."
The court then held that it was for the jury to decide whether the drover in this
case "to avoid collision did all that prudent men in general would do in his situation," but went on to add these words which were to become the substantial basis
of the rule:
"The traveler has the obligation of prudence upon him. He is bound to
stop and lookout for trains, and may not rush heedlessly, nor remain unnecessarily on a spot over which the law allows engines of fearful power
to be propelled by one of the most resistless agents of nature."
In the next case, PennsylvaniaRailroad Company v. Ogierl it was not questioned that the traveler had the duty to stop and look out, but whether under the
circumstances, the deceased had performed his full duty to be free of contributory
negligence. Had the deceased stopped his horse and buggy 10 feet from the track
he could have seen 623 feet eastward and the approaching train; had he stopped
18 feet from the railroad he could have seen 352 feet; but where Dr. Ogier stopped
was 84 feet from the track at the top of a hill approaching the grade where
it was customary for travelers to stop since they could not again see the
tracks until they were within 18 feet, which, it was testified, could not be
3 6 Casey 454 (Pa. 1858).
4 11 Casey 60 (Pa. 1860).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

safely done because the horses might become frightened. In theory, if the doctor
had stopped 10 feet from the track, this particular train would have been only
174 feet away and the one in danger had only 17 seconds within which to act.
Under these circumstances, whether the doctor had acted as a prudent man was
a question for the jury.
Then followed the case 5 of a pedestrian who had crossed the railroad tracks
without stopping and was killed before he reached the other side. His widow
recovered. Although the lower court had refused the defendant railroad's point
for charge that it was the duty of the deceased to stop, the judge's refusal was
not assigned as error on appeal. The Supreme Court, after saying that the verdict
was scarcely justifiable on the evidence, could not reverse the lower court on the
points assigned as error.
In the following year, in North Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Hedeman,6 the
court first held that failure to look was negligence per se. On a rainy morning the
plaintiff, who was driving a covered wagon with the curtains closed, was struck
while crossing a railroad grade. The evidence was uncontradicted that he failed
to look out and the question of his contributory negligence was submitted to the
jury, with the charge that his failure to look was evidence of negligence. The
Supreme Court cited the Reeves case quoting the phrase '.'he is bound to stop and
look out" which is actually not what the case held, to support its decision. Then it
reversed the lower court for the error of submitting the case to the jury saying,
"When the standard is fixed, and where the measure of duty is defined by the
law, entire omission to perform it is negligence." The court justified its decision
with the reason that the "movement of trains is so speedy and the results of
the collision so disastrous."
Then came thc case of Hanover Railroad Co. v. Coyle7 which introduced the
plaintiff who was "muffled up with his coat, comfort and buffalo rug" and the
third requirement, namely, to listen. Although the plaintiff recovered since the
case was submitted to the jury on the controverted evidence of whether Coyle had
stopped, looked and listened, and the defendant's remedy for the alleged improper
verdict was a new trial, not a writ of error, the Supreme Court approved the lower
court's charge defining the well known standard of care required of every plaintiff
in grade crossing accidents.
"Itwas the duty of the plaintiff ...to have stopped his wagon; ...
to have listened to hear the whistle or the noise of the engine and cars,
and to look to see if an engine or train was coming."
In Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Beale, 8 the Supreme Court with two of the
five judges dissenting, flatly held that failure to stop was negligence per se. The

5 47

Pa. 244 (1864).
6 49 Pa. 60 (1865).
7 55 Pa. 396 (1867).
8 73 Pa. 504 (1873).
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facts were these: A widow was suing for the death of her husband; the plaintiff
admitted that the deceased did not stop before crossing tht track because had he
stopped, as other evidence verified, he could not have seen. The lower court submitted the case to the jury charging:
"While the law is fixed and settled, that it is the duty of the traveler to
stop, look and listen before he goes upon a track, yet we do not understand the rule to be of such universal application as to control a case
where stopping, looking and listening would have been in vain. The law
does not demand vain and impossible things. Cases of this kind must
necessarily rest upon the peculiar facts and circumstances."
The Supreme Court answered:
"There never was a more important principle settled than that the fact
of the failure to stop immediately before crossing a railroad track, is not
merely evidence of negligence for the jury but negligence per se, and
a question for the court. (citing the Heileman case) . . . Therefore, in
every case of collision the rule must be an unbending one. It is important
not so much to railroad companies as to the traveling public. Collisions
of this character have often resulted in the loss of hundreds of valuable
lives, of passengers on trains, and they will continue to do so again, if
the travelers crossing railroads are not taught their simple duty, not to
themselves only but to others."
Thus, with the Beale case, what the law expected of the plaintiff in grade crossing
litigation was established.
To summarize the holdings of the above formative cases discloses:
1. The Reeves case held the standard of care the plaintiff was to exercise was
a question for the jury.
2. The Heileman case held that failure to look was negligence per se citing
the Reeves case to support this proposition.
3. The Beale case held failure to stop was negligence per se using the Heileman case to support this proposition.
4. No case has squarely held that failure to listen is negligence per se.
The courts, having established well before 1900 what the rule was, then
had to protect it against any modifications, which they have successfully done,
for the rule is still as strict and unbending today. To combat the possibility of testimony of the plaintiff taking the case to the jury, the incontrovertible physical
facts rule was developed. 9 This means that if the plaintiff testifies that he stopped,
looked and listened, but evidence shows that had he actually done as he said, the
collision would have been avoided, the verdict will be directed for the defendant.

9 296 Pa. 319, 145 A. 840 (1929).
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Nor will the law permit any excuse or justification for non-performance,
such as absence of a warning sign, 10 or of a raised safety gate, 11 or the plaintiff's
ignorance of the country and the existence of the crossing,' 2 or the fact that a railroad siding is a private one, 13 or that it was in a city or town rather than the open
country, 14 or that his horse was frightened and he could not be controlled. 15 These
and many other distinctions and exceptions have been raised in the hundred years
16
of the rule's existence but to no avail. In the language of the court:
"The rule to stop, look and listen is not a rule of evidence but a rule
of law peremptory, absolute, and unbending, and the jury can never
be permitted to ignore it, to evade it, or to pare it away by distinction
and exception."
From a rule that was first applied to cows it has been extended to bicycles, 17
to pedestrians, 8 to fire engines, to hose carts and ambulances, 19 to sleighs,' 0 and to
automobiles. 21 In one novel case,22 the deceased was riding a bicycle when he
came to the tracks. He did not dismount but circled on his wheel several times at
a distance of four or five feet from the tracks. When he crossed he was struck. Was
this a "stop"? The Court answered this very clfarly:
"It was the duty of the deceased to stop and dismount in order to make
his stop effective, for the purposes of looking and listening. The real
contention of the appellant is embodied in the proposition that the circling round and round constituted a legai as well as a 'bicycler's' stop.
No such proposition can be entertained.
The United States Supreme Court case of Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.
v. Goodman23 was often used in Pennsylvania to support its law, since Judge
Holmes defined the standard of care as follows:
"It seems to us that if a driver cannot be sure otherwise whether a train
is dangerously near he must stop and get out of his vehicle, although
obviously he will not often be required to do more than stop and look."
However, this case was later limited by Pokarav. Wabash Ry. Co.24 in which it was
h-eld that the standard of care which the plaintiff was to use was a question for
the jury.
10 207 Pa. 306, 113 A. 370 (1921).
11 276 Pa. 508, 120 A. 449 (1923).
12 225 Pa. 528, 74 A. 373 (1909).
13 195 Pa. 538, 46 A. 106 (1899).

14 124 Pa. 572, 17 A. 188 (1889). This is a distinction made in street railway cases applying
the stop, look and listen rule.
16
16
17
18
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550, 70 A. 852 (1908).
Super. 320. (1917).
43, 36 A. 403 (1897).
38, 18 A. 600 (1889).
113, 64 A. 323 (1906).
349 (1885).
246 Pa. 367, 92 A. 340 (1914).
221
67
180
130
215
108

Pa.
Pa.
Pa.
Pa.
Pa.
Pa.

180 Pa. 429, 36 A. 923 (1897).
275 U. S. 66, 48 Sup. Ct. 24 (1927).
292 U. S.98, 54 Sup. Ct. 580 (1934).
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The only case this writer could discover in which the stop, look and listen
rule was criticised was the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Simpson, in which
Mr. Justice Stewart joined, in Benner v. Philadelphiaand Reading Railroad Co.25
The dissent inquired into the reason for the rule, and the propriety of a court foreclosing the rights of future unheard litigants, by a harsh, arbitrary and unbending
rule, without legislative action. While they doubted the wisdom of the rule, they
felt that stare decisis compelled their adherence to it, yet they would be in favor
of modifying it to conform to reasonable requirements.
After nearly a hundred years of steadfast adherence to the rule that failure
to stop, look and listen is negligence per se, the following are some of the reasons
that can be advanced as to why such conduct should be evidence of negligence and
the question of the standard of care required of the plaintiff be submitted to the
jury under the given facts and circumstances of a particular case.
1.Historically, the standard of care was originally a jury question.
2. If the plaintiff survives, the rule is conducive to perjury.
3. If the traveler is killed, his survivor often gains the procedural advantage of having the case submitted to the jury on the presumption that the
deceased used due care.
4. The weight of judicial authority, including the United States Supreme
Court, is to the contrary.
5. The Vehicle Code requires no such duty of the average motorist in the
absence of plainly visible signs requiring him to stop, such as lights or
flagmen.2 6
6. The justification for the rule is no longer valid, that is "the movement
of trains is so speedy and the results of a collision so disastrous." 2 7 This
is particularly true as to sidings and infrequently used spur lines.
7. The great technological development of motor transportation that was
unknown at the time that the rule was developed for the horse and
buggy in the 1860's. The law was originally formulated at a time when
railroads crossed infrequently used highways and the speed of trains was
superior to any other type of conveyance. Moreover, the increased number
of motorists on the highway should mean the increased protection for
the motorist if the justification is to protect the traveling public.
8. The rule does not escribe the realities of the present day conditions. This
harsh, arbitrary, and unbending rule of law does not reflect the standard
of care used by the reasonably prudent man as every motorist well knows.
26 266 Pa. 307, 105 A. 283 (1918).
26 Act of May 1, 1929, P. L. 905, Article X, § 1003, 75 P. S. 502 (Pa.).
27 See note 6, supra.
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When the law requires unreasonable and vain acts from men they will not conform. As Mr. Justice Simpson so frankly said in the Benner28 case:
"Everyone, even all those who adopted and those who enforce the rule
of 'stop, look and listen' in all human probability would have acted
just as the plaintiff's husband did."
Or in the words of Judge Cardozo in the Pokara case: 29
"(there is a) need for caution in framing standards of behavior that
amount to rules of law. The need is more urgent when there is no background of experience out of which the standards have emerged. They
are then, not the natural flowerings of behavior in its customary forms,
but rules artificially developed, and imposed from without. Extraordinary situations may not wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or regulations
that are fitting for the commonplace or normal. In default of the guide
of customary conduct, what is suitable for the traveler caught in a mesh
where the ordinary safeguards fail him is for the judgment of the jury."
Mary L. Casanave
28 See note 25, supra.

29 See note 24, supra.

